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Abstract
Legal documents, in the form of terms of service agreements
and other private contracts, are now an increasingly prevalent
part of everyday life. While legal documents have long been
acknowledged to be difficult to understand without training, it
remains an open question whether the ever-increasing expo-
sure to contracts might have mitigated this difficulty. More-
over, insofar as this difficulty has persisted, there remains no
systematic analysis of which linguistic structures contribute
most heavily to the processing difficulty of legal texts, nor
whether this difficulty is heightened for those with less lan-
guage experience. Here, we investigate these issues, and in a
well-powered experiment find evidence that (a) both recall and
comprehension of legal propositions in a contract are hindered
by use of a legal register relative to plain-English translations;
(b) certain linguistic structures, such as center-embedding, hin-
der recall to a greater degree than others, such as passive voice;
and (c) language experience influences comprehension of legal
propositions. Surprisingly, language experience did not influ-
ence recall, nor was there an interaction between legal register
and language experience on recall or comprehension. These
findings suggest that legal language poses heightened difficul-
ties for those with less language experience–who tend to be
of lower socioeconomic status and with diminished access to
the justice system–and that eliminating complex features of
legalese would benefit those of all reading levels.
Keywords: legal language; language processing; memory
The mismatch between the ubiquity and impenetrability
of legal documents has been a long-standing and seemingly
intractable issue. Dating as far back to the plain language
movement in the 1970s, government officials have acknowl-
edged the need to simplify public legal documents for the
benefit of society at large. Since then, there has been a size-
able literature exploring how to best simplify public-facing
legal language, such as jury instructions (Charrow & Char-
row, 1979; Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1982; Heuer & Penrod,
1989; Diamond, Murphy, & Rose, 2012; Randall, 2019) and
Miranda warnings (Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman, &
Geier, 2003; Rogers, Harrison, Shuman, Sewell, & Hazel-
wood, 2007).
While these studies have successfully demonstrated the ef-
ficacy of identifying and replacing problematic features of le-
gal text (such as archaic legal jargon and complex syntax)
with “plain English” equivalents to increase comprehension
rates among laypeople, they only apply to a very small por-
tion of the total corpus of legal language. A small and dimin-
ishing percentage of civil and criminal cases actually go to
trial (as low as 3% for the former and 5% for the latter: Refo,
2004; Rakoff, Daumier, & Case, 2014). The majority of in-
dividuals’ contact with legal language takes place outside the
context of criminal or civil suits and involves more than just
public-facing documents, such as contracts and other private-
facing documents.
In the case of private legal documents, the literature in this
regard has been more scarce. One notable exception to this
is Masson and Waldron (1994), which investigated how cleri-
cal staff (n = 24) and age-matched students (n = 24) recalled
and comprehended aspects of four short (≈ 400 words) le-
gal contract texts. Masson and Waldron (1994) found that
less complex–“plain English”–texts were recalled and com-
prehended better than more complex actual legal texts.
In the decades since these findings, contracts have become
an increasingly ubiquitous part of the modern era, particu-
larly with the rise of the internet and the constant exposure to
online terms of service agreements. It remains an open ques-
tion whether this increased exposure might have mitigated the
difficulty of reading legal texts.
While the research on processing difficulties in legal lan-
guage has been sparse, our understanding of language pro-
cessing difficulties in terms of the surface properties of text
has greatly improved. As it turns out, several structures that
have been identified as difficult to process in the psycholin-
guistic literature (e.g. clausal embedding: Gibson, 1998;
Pinker, 2003; low-frequency words: Rayner, Ashby, Pollat-
sek, & Reichle, 2004; passive voice: Ferreira, 2003) are re-
putedly abundant in legal texts (e.g. P. M. Tiersma, 1993;
P. Tiersma, 2008), and some are especially prevalent in con-
tracts (e.g. passive voice: Goźdź-Roszkowski, 2011; all-caps:
Arbel & Toler, 2020).
Here we seek to build upon these findings, as well as those
of Masson and Waldron (1994), to better understand to what
extent (a) contractual language continues to present difficul-
ties in recall and comprehension (both overall, and relative
to a simpler alternative), (b) such difficulties are mitigated
or exacerbated by one’s experience and/or skill with general
reading ability, and (c) particular linguistic features give rise
to this difficulty in the first place.
To that end, we conducted a high powered conceptual repli-
cation of Masson and Waldron (1994) where we constructed
short legal contracts that varied linguistic structures known to
incur processing difficulties. We also implemented the author
recognition task (ART; Stanovich & West, 1989; Moore &
Gordon, 2015), which measures individual differences in ex-
perience with language. We replicate Masson and Waldron
(1994)’s main finding that information presented in a legal
register is recalled and recognized less frequently and accu-
rately than when presented in simple language. Further, we
find that comprehension of legal language in general is related
to experience with language. Lastly, we provide a descriptive
analysis of how individual linguistic structures relate to the
difference in performance across legal and simple registers.
Methods
Materials
Our primary materials consisted of 12 pairs of short contract
excerpts of roughly 150 words each (see Figure 1). First,
twelve excerpts were constructed in a standard “legalese”
register by the first author, a lawyer, who modeled the con-
tent and form of the materials after common naturalistic con-
tracts. Each of the 12 texts for each condition corresponded to
one of three types of common contract provisions (with four
texts pertaining to each genre), including: (1) general con-
tract provisions, specifying the basic terms of a contractual
agreement; (2) liability and warranty provisions, specifying
to what degree each party could be sued or held accountable
for not adhering to the terms of the agreement; and (3) juris-
diction, venue and choice-of-law provisions, specifying how
and where parties could sue or be held accountable for not
fulfilling the terms of the agreement. Each legalese text was
drafted to contain the following language properties that have
been identified as difficult to process and common to legal
texts:
(a) Low-frequency legal terms–Words that are infrequently
used in everyday speech provide processing difficulties for
readers relative to higher-frequency synonyms (Marks, Doc-
torow, & Wittrock, 1974). Legal texts are laden with “ar-
chaic words” such as aforesaid, herein, and to wit (P. Tiersma,
2008), which have been shown to be frequently misunder-
stood by laypeople (e.g. P. M. Tiersma, 1993). Each legalese
text was constructed to contain several instances of legal jar-
gon, which were replaced with high-frequency synonyms in
the plain-English versions.
(b) Center-embedded clauses–Center-embedded structures
have long been observed to pose processing difficulties on
a reader (Miller & Chomsky, 1963; Gibson, 1998; Pinker,
2003). The tendency for lawyers to “embed” legal jargon
“in convoluted syntax” has been observed not only to be
prevalent in legal texts but as a potential badge of honor
for those who wish to “talk like a lawyer” and be accepted
by their profession (P. Tiersma, 2008). Each legalese text
was constructed to contain multiple center-embedded clauses
(“Artist and Tour, said parties being hereinafter referred
as...”), which were written as separate sentences in the cor-
responding plain-English version.
(c) Passive-voice structures–Relative to their active-voice
counterparts, passive-voice structures are acquired later by
children (Baldie, 1976), and may continue to pose difficul-
ties for adults (Ferreira, 2003). Goźdź-Roszkowski (2011)
found passive structures to be more prevalent in contracts
relative to other legal and non-legal genres (such as news-
papers). Our legalese texts each contained multiple passive-
voice structures (“This agreement has been formed by the
parties”), which we converted into active-voice structures in
the corresponding plain-English versions.
(d) Capitalization–Non-standard capitalization is ubiqui-
tous in provisions such as warranty disclaimers and limita-
tions of liability, which “must be conspicuous” in order to be
legally upheld (American Law Institute and National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 2002). Arbel
and Toler (2020) found that most standard form agreements
used by major companies contain a provision in all-caps. Al-
though the use of all-caps provisions is ostensibly for the
benefit of the reader, evidence suggests that they do not aid
comprehension (Arbel & Toler, 2020). Here we included at
least one chunk of all-capitalized text in each legalese passage
(“THE WARRANTY IS HEREBY DISCLAIMED”), which was
replaced with standard capitalization in the simple version.
From the set of legalese materials, each passage was en-
coded in terms of legally relevant propositions. From these
propositions, each passage was then translated into a “plain-
English” version, which differed only with respect to the four
surface properties described above, resulting in 24 total pas-
sages.
For each contract pair, 12-15 comprehension questions
were drafted. The questions were multiple choice with four
options. These questions both targeted comprehension of spe-
cific important legal propositions, as well as more general un-
derstanding of the legal content. To reduce a response bias
for a given register, we controlled the overlap in form be-
Figure 1: An example stimulus pair in legalese (left) and simple (right) register. The differences in surface properties across
registers are depicted by font style. Bold denotes word frequency. Italic denotes embedded clauses. Underlined denotes voice.
Unfortunately, we have run out of font styles to make differences in capitalization more apparent.
tween contract excerpt and comprehension question. Both
types of comprehension question were drafted in a “neutral”
register. Passive/active structures were replaced by nominal-
izations. For example, “shipment of the goods on the part of
merchant” instead of “the goods were shipped by merchant”
or “merchant shipped the goods”). High or low frequency
synonyms were replaced with a third synonym (e.g. “renter”
instead of “lessee” or “tenant”).
In addition to our main experimental materials, we admin-
istered the Author Recognition Task (ART; Moore & Gor-
don, 2015) as a proxy for language experience.
Participants and Procedure
Based on a pilot study (n = 32), we found that 100 partici-
pants would provide us sufficient power (> 80%) to detect our
main effects in both recall and comprehension. Due to con-
cerns about data validity with online collection, we actively
assessed data quality during the experiment. Participants first
completed three trials and were only allowed to complete the
experiment if their comprehension was above chance perfor-
mance. In total we recruited 186 participants for the first half,
but we only retain 108 participants who completed the entire
experiment for our analysis. All participants self-identified as
native English users.
Retained participants were pseudorandomly assigned to six
trials (3 legalese; 3 simple). Participants did not see the same
contract in both a simple and legal register. Assignment of
stimuli to participant was pseudorandom to ensure that across
participants every trial was administered with approximately
the same frequency. The order of trials was randomized for
each participant.
A trial consisted of (a) reading an excerpt, (b) a subset of
the ART, (c) recalling the excerpt, and (d) answering com-
prehension questions. For the reading component, partici-
pants were presented with exactly one excerpt, written in ei-
ther legalese or plain English. They were asked to carefully
read the text twice, and were given as much time as needed
to do so. For the ART component, participants were given
the names of 50 individuals and were asked to select which
names corresponded to real authors. The actual ART is 130
items but we needed 300. Therefore, the items were from the
actual ART for the first three trials. For the remaining trials,
the participants were administered “filler” items that looked
virtually the same as authentic materials (half of the names
corresponding to real authors, the other half corresponding to
high-school track stars) but which had not been validated the
same way. We do not use these fillers in our analysis. Af-
ter being shown the ART materials, participants were asked
to recall as much of the excerpt they had read as possible.
They were told that they could use their own words, but that
their version should stay true to the original. Finally, each
trial ended with the comprehension questions corresponding
to the excerpt.
Analysis Plan
Two trained research assistants coded whether a proposition
was successfully recalled. In doing so, they were presented
with a participant’s retelling of a passage and then asked
whether each legally relevant proposition of the passage was
(a) fully recalled; (b) partially recalled; or (c) not recalled.
Coders were told that for a response to count as “fully re-
called,” it did not have to be recalled verbatim (i.e. they can
use their own words or syntax), so long as they were confi-
dent that the meaning of what subject wrote is the same as the
proposition.
For example, suppose the original text said “A court in
Boston will resolve the dispute,” and the participant wrote
“something will be resolved by a court.” When coding re-
sponses, a coder might see three propositions that say: (i) “A
court in Boston,” (ii) “will resolve,” and (iii) “the dispute.”
For (i), the coder would put a 0.5 for “partially recalled”
(since “in Boston” was missing from “a court”); for (ii), the
coder would put a 1 for “fully recalled” (since “will be re-
solved” means basically the same thing as “will resolve”),
and for (iii), the coder would put a 0 for “not recalled” (since
“the dispute“ was not in the response).
To reduce potential bias, coders were unaware of whether
a participant had seen or recalled the simple or legalese ver-
sion of a text. Of the roughly 650 retellings, each coder
was responsible for coding roughly 60 percent (≈ 390) of
the retellings, such that (a) every retelling/proposition would
be coded at least once, and (b) 20% of the retellings would
be coded by both coders so as to assess inter-rater reliability.
Coder reliability was assessed with Cohen’s kappa coefficient
(Cohen, 1960; McHugh, 2012).
We adjudicated ties as follows: (i) a tie between one “fully
recalled” judgment and one “not recalled” judgment resulted
in a final “partially recalled” judgment; (ii) a tie between one
“fully recalled” judgment and one “partially recalled” judg-
ment resulted in a final “fully recalled” judgment for a given
proposition; and (iii) a tie between one “partially recalled”
judgment and one “not recalled” judgment resulted in a fi-
nal “not recalled” judgment. For our regression analyses, we
perform both a conservative analysis (recoding “partially re-
called” as “not recalled’) and an anti-conservative analysis
(recoding “partiall recalled” as “fully recalled”). Our results
do not qualitatively change, so we will only report the con-
servative analysis here.
Results
We set out to address three questions: 1) can we replicate
Masson and Waldron (1994)’s result that comprehension and
recall of contracts presented in a legal register is worse than
that of contracts presented in a simple register? 2) If so, is the
decline in performance worse for people with less written lan-
guage experience? 3) How do individual linguistic structures
purportedly prevalent in legal text contribute to the decline in
recall of legal propositions? We will take the first two ques-
tions in turn for comprehension and recall. Then, we will
provide an exploratory description to address the third.
Comprehension
Following Masson and Waldron (1994), we predict compre-
hension will be greater for text presented in the simple regis-
ter than in the legalese register. We additionally predicted that
the effect of register will be larger for participants who scored
low on the ART task. Figure 2a illustrates the comprehension
accuracy across registers and Figure 2b depicts comprehen-
sion accuracy as a function of ART score. Descriptively, par-
ticipants were more accurate in the simple register (73.5%)
than in the legalese register (67.7%).
We first conducted a mixed effect logistic regression, with
register, standardized ART score and their interaction as fixed
effects and comprehension question, excerpt, and participant
as random effects, each with a random slope for register. Us-
ing likelihood ratio test to compare to a model without the
interaction term, we found no significant interaction between
standardized ART score and register. Therefore, we report the
results of the model fit without the interaction term. Repli-
cating Masson and Waldron (1994), we find a significant de-
crease in comprehension accuracy for a legalese register com-
pared to a simple register (β=−0.179, SE= 0.052, p< 0.05).
While we did not find an interaction between language ex-
perience and register, we do find that participants with less
language experience (lower ART scores) have worse compre-
hension accuracy than participants with more language expe-
rience (β = 0.219, SE= 0.076, p < 0.05).
Recall of Legal Propositions
Before we analyse our predictions, we assessed coder agree-
ment. Our two coders agreed on approximately 85% of over-
lapping judgments. Cohen’s Kappa (unweighted) was mea-
sured to be 0.719 (z = 47.1; p < 0.05), indicating substantial
agreement.
Again following Masson and Waldron (1994), we expect
participants to recall fewer legal propositions when the text
is presented in a legal register compared to a simple register.
We further predicted an interaction with language experience,
such that recall would be worse for people with less language
experience. Figure 2c displays the proportion of propositions
recalled across registers and Figure 2d renders the proportion
recalled as a function of ART score. Overall, the average re-
call among participants was 41.1%, which is slightly better
than recall rates for previous studies using text materials but
a longer delay (Bergman & Roediger, 1999). Descriptively,
propositions from excerpts in a simple register (45.9%) were
recalled more than propositions presented in a legalese regis-
ter (38.4%).
As for comprehension, we first conducted a mixed effect
logistic regression with register, standardized ART score and
their interaction as fixed effects and excerpt and participant as
random effects with register as a random slope for each. Us-
ing likelihood ratio tests, we fail to find a significant interac-
tion and, thus, report here a simpler model without the inter-
action term. Again replicating Masson and Waldron (1994),
fewer legal propositions were recalled when they were pre-
sented in a legalese register compared to a simple register
(β =−0.219, SE= 0.081, p < 0.05). Unlike our comprehen-
sion results, we do not find an effect of language experience
on recall.
Exploring the effect of linguistic structures
While surface properties of a text seem to be forgotten rel-
atively quickly (e.g., within an hour; Fisher & Radvansky,
2018) compared to propositional content (lasting weeks), it
seems intuitive that they might appreciably influence mem-
ory for more abstract representations of content. If a reader
can’t understand or mis-parses the text, it’s highly unlikely
that they make the intended inferences and have a full grasp
of the situation. Therefore, we expect linguistic structures
known to incur processing difficulties to reduce the propor-
tion of legal propositions recalled. Here, we focused on four
kinds of structures purportedly common in a legal register
and manipulated in our materials: embedded clauses, pas-
sive voice, frequency of lexical choice and capitalization. We
do not have sufficient power to assess the generalizability of
each structure’s influence on recall. Instead, we provide a
description of each structure’s effect using Bayesian mixed
effect logistic regression.
Figure 2: (a) Mean comprehension accuracy across registers. (b) Comprehension accuracy as a function ART score. (c) Mean
proportion of legal propositions recalled across registers. (d) Proportion of legal propositions recalled as a function of ART
score. In (a) and (c), lineranges reflect 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals and faded lines reflect individual subject averages.






-0.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4
Beta weight
Figure 3: The influence of each surface property on the effect
of register. Line ranges reflect the 95% credible intervals over
the interaction term and points reflect medians.
For every proposition, we coded if the surface form across
registers was unedited or differed in clausal embedding,
voice, word frequency or capitalization. We conducted a
mixed effect logistic regression predicting recall with surface
form as a fixed effect and random intercepts for excerpt and
participant. Our fixed effect was coded so that each coeffi-
cient reflects either an increase or decrease in recall rate for a
legalese register relative to the average recall rate of a simple
register. Figure 3 represents the 95% credible interval over
the regression coefficient for each surface property. As a san-
ity check, the propositions that were unedited across register
do not differ in rate of recall. We find the strongest effects
of register for propositions that differed in embedding or fre-
quency, a smaller effect of capitalization and perhaps surpris-
ingly, no effect for voice.
Discussion
Our study aimed to assess whether (a) contractual legal lan-
guage continues to present difficulties in recall and compre-
hension (both overall, and relative to a simpler alternative),
(b) such difficulties are mitigated or exacerbated by one’s ex-
perience and/or skill with general reading ability, and (c) par-
ticular syntactic or semantic features give rise to this difficulty
in the first place. Here we discuss in turn the extent to which
our results successfully answer these questions.
With regard to (a), we replicate Masson and Waldron
(1994)’s findings that redrafting legal texts into a simpler reg-
ister can lead to increases in both comprehension and recall
over that of the original text. This suggests that the complex
language used in contracts continues to present difficulties to
one’s ability to absorb and remember the content in such doc-
uments, despite the increased exposure to these documents
over the last couple of decades.
With regard to (b), our results extend the findings of
(Masson & Waldron, 1994) by revealing that language
experience–as measured by ART–predicted comprehension
performance, suggesting that those with less language experi-
ence have a harder time understanding legal texts. Given that
those with less reading experience as a group tend to be of
lower socioeconomic status (Kieffer, 2010; Bradley & Cor-
wyn, 2002), and those of lower SES face greater disenfran-
chisement from the legal system (Legal Services Corpora-
tion, 2017), this suggests that simplifying contracts may have
non-trivial access to justice implications, particularly as their
prevalence increases.
At the same time, there was no correlation between ART
and recall performance, nor was there a significant interac-
tion between register and performance on ART in predicting
recall or comprehension; that is, those who scored higher on
the ART did not have a necessarily easier time on the legalese
texts relative to the plain English texts, nor did they have an
easier time recalling texts of either register relative to poorer
readers. Taken together, our results suggest that redrafting
texts into a simpler register has beneficial effects on compre-
hension for readers of all reading levels.
With regard to (c), our results suggest that some of the fea-
tures that are common to legal texts–such as clausal embed-
ding and low-frequency words–present greater difficulties in
the context of recall than others, such as passive voice, sug-
gesting that lawyers interested in simplifying legal texts for
the benefit of readers ought to prioritize unpacking clauses
into separate sentences and opting for higher frequency syn-
onyms when possible.
Having established that the average person’s processing
difficulties with legal text remain despite the presumed uptick
in experience, we should aim to understand why lawyers
choose to write in such an esoteric manner in the first place?
One possibility is that legal language must be written so to
maintain communicative precision. This possibility is par-
tially ruled out by our results and previous findings that show
comprehension of legal content with a simplified register
(e.g., Masson & Waldron, 1994). While it seems entirely
plausible that certain legal jargon is inevitable, our results
demonstrate that in many instances such jargon can be re-
placed with simpler alternatives that increase recall and com-
prehension while preserving meaning.
Another possibility is that lawyers choose to write in a
complex manner to convey their priorities. For example, if
a lawyer prioritizes the user’s responsibilities they may focus
on making them clear at the expense of other content (e.g.,
company’s obligations). If the lawyer’s priorities differ from
the reader’s priorities they may even do this implicitly as op-
posed to engaging in an outright “conspiracy of gobblede-
gook” (Mellinkoff, 2004)
Lastly, lawyers may not choose to write in an esoteric man-
ner. Similar to the “curse of knowledge” (Hinds, 1999; Nick-
erson, 1999), they may not realize that their language is too
complicated for the average reader to understand (Azuelos-
Atias, 2018). Further work into the plausibility of these hy-
potheses could yield insight into how best to persuade lawyers
to integrate the findings of our and similar studies and help
alleviate the growing mismatch between the ubiquity and im-
penetrability of legal texts in the modern era.
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